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JURISDICTION 
Respondent Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association (the "Association") 
agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in the Petitioner's Opening Brief.1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This is a companion case to No. 20050805-SC, brought against the Association Paul 
Howard Peters ("Peters"), owner of a single lot in the Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D 
subdivision. That subdivision was developed by Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. ("Pine 
Meadow"), an entity run by Brent Jensen. Here, as in the Forest Meadow case, a writ of 
certiorari was granted as to a single issue only: 
Whether Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. had the authority as 
a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and 
restrictions. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Issue No. 1: Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2 (2000); Jacobs 
v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1994); Capital Assets Financial Services 
v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 2000); Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. 
Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989). 
Issue No. 2: Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000); Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College, 114 
Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949); Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 
2000). 
1
 Petitioner, Paul Howard Peters, is a lawyer. He was the president and chief 
executive office of the Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, LLC, the 
Petitioner in the companion case, No. 20050805-SC, at the time of the filing of that matter. 
(Affidavit in Support of Petition for Summary Relief, Forest Meadow Record, pp. 9-59.) He 
personally reviewed the records of Summit County both in connection with his assistance of 
the owner of the Petitioner in the Forest Meadow case, Mr. Grabowski (Forest Meadow R 8-
18) and with regard to his own lot at issue herein (R. 12-14). 
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Issue No. 3: Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Rule 8.2 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Peters filed this action six years ago in an effort to avoid annual assessments of $175 
made by the Association and levied under the thirty-year-old Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions for the Pine Meadow Subdivisions ("1973 CC&Rs") recorded in Summit 
County. Specifically, this appeal seeks to nullify the 1973 CC&Rs, which Peters terms 
"wrongful liens" against his property. Copies of the 1973 CC&Rs and Plat D are furnished 
in Peters' Appendix. 
In January 1999, Peters acquired Lot 6D expressly "[sjubject to easements, covenants 
restrictions, rights of way and reservations appearing of record and, taxes for the year 1999, 
and each year thereafter." (R. 215). He recognizes that Pine Meadow recorded the CC&Rs 
in 1973 against a large tract of real property in Summit County, Utah. (R. 0221-30). 
Compellingly, Peters, a lawyer, took title of Lot 6D with notice of the 1973 CC&Rs and the 
1980 Lien Notice. Id. However, Peters has never paid his annual $175 assessment, despite 
voting at the Association's meetings and enjoying the roadway improvements and other 
benefits provided by the Association. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
In December 1999, Peters filed a petition under the Summary Procedures of Utah's 
Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. seeking to nullify a 1980 Lien 
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Notice recorded by the Association, claiming it was a wrongful lien (R. 0001-14.) After his 
effort under the Summary Procedures was twice rejected by the district court, Peters 
ultimately filed an Amended Complaint seeking relief from the 1973 CC&Rs and the 1980 
Lien Notice. As a result, Peters argued, he should not be required to pay any assessments. 
(Id). In late 2003, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment urging the court to 
resolve these issues as a matter of law. (R. 0184A-85; 0234-35.) The district court denied 
Peters' motion for summary judgment and granted the Association's cross-motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 0416-20.)2 Peters then filed a "Second" motion for summary 
judgment that was also denied by the trial court. (R. 0424-0425; 0421.) 
In May 2004, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Association and 
against Peters. (R. 0479-83.) The judgment ordered, adjudged and decreed (1) that Pine 
Meadow, an owner and the subdivider of the land that includes the lot now owned by Peters, 
properly encumbered Lot 6D and others in its development with the 1973 CC&Rs; (2) that 
the burdens and benefits of the 1973 CC&Rs run with the land and have done so for thirty 
years and, as a result, Peters' challenge to the 1973 CC&Rs is untimely; (3) that Peters 
2
 The district court incorporated in its ruling its prior decision in a companion 
case Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, L.L.C., v. Pine Meadow Ranch 
Home Association (also known as Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association and as 
Pine Meadow Ranch Association), which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 
Appellate Case No. 20040397-CA. This Court granted a writ of certiorari in that matter, 
Case NO. 20050805 - SC, on the identical issue presented here. The Association's brief in 
Forest Meadow is filed contemporaneously herewith. Because the issue before the Court 
was fully briefed in Forest Meadow, those arguments are repeated in large part herein. 
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bought Lot 6D with notice of the 1973 CC&Rs and acquired title subject to them, and 
therefore, it would be inequitable for Peters not to comply with them; and (4) that the 1973 
CC&Rs, the 1980 Lien Notice and the 2003 Clarification of Notice of Lien are not wrongful 
liens against Peters' property. (R. 0479-83.) 
Peters appealed to the Court of Appeals which, after briefing and oral argument, 
issued its Memorandum Decision on June 30, 2005, a copy of which is attached to Peters' 
Opening Brief. Therein the Court of Appeals unanimously rejected Peters' arguments. 
Peters then asked for rehearing. That request was denied by the Court of Appeals on July 20, 
2005. 
A Petition for Writ of Certiorari was then filed by Peters, seeking review of the 
decision of the Court of Appeals on nine separate grounds. (Petition, pp. iv -v.) The Petition 
was granted as to a single issue only: "Whether Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. had the authority 
as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions and restrictions." The issue, 
as defined by this Court, assumes that Security Title held legal title in its capacity as trustee 
to the land that later became Lot 6D, and that Pine Meadow held beneficial title to that land 
at the time the 1973 CC&Rs were recorded. In its Opening Brief, however, Petitioner 
challenges that basis for that assumption and wanders beyond the grant of certiorari, 
including arguments on the nature of trusts generally, ratification and agency, and the statute 
of frauds. The Association believes these arguments are in the nature of a plenary appeal, 
beyond the issues fairly encompassed by the order granting certiorari. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. The Association was incorporated August 14, 1973, by Brent Jensen and 
Vincent B. Tolmann to act as the owners' association for the Pine Meadow Subdivisions 
located in Summit County, Utah. (R. 0259.) 
2. Peters is the owner of Lot 6D through a 1999 Warranty Deed from Raymond 
R. Blanchard recorded as entry number 00528112, Book 01222, page 00335 in the Summit 
County Recorder's Office (R. 0215, 0188). Peters took the property expressly subject "to 
easements, covenants restrictions, rights of way and reservations appearing of record and, 
taxes for the year 1999, and each year thereafter." (R. 0215.) 
3. Brent Jensen and his various companies, including Pine Meadow, were the 
developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 0259.) Legal title for 
the land that was later included in those subdivisions was held by Security Title as "Trustee," 
a plainly declared represented capacity. {Id.) 
4. Over twenty years ago, the Utah Supreme Court described Brent Jensen and 
his interests as the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. See 
Leo M. Bertanole, Inc., 639 P.2d at 212 (noting that in 1970 "Brent Jensen, a defendant, 
bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for development purposes . . . . By January 1, 
1975,380 mountain lots had been sold in areas served by Tollgate Road, including Jensen's 
Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions"). 
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5. On September 23, 1973, Pme Meadow recorded a set of CC&Rs entitled 
"Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions," as entry No. 120967, 
Book No. M50, Pages 521-530 in Summit County. (R. 0204.) 
6. The 1973 CC&Rs were executed by PMRFs President, W. Brent Jensen. 
(R. 0221-30.) They plainly recite and declare that the CC&Rs are established by Pine 
Meadow, "the owner of or intends to acquire certain property in Summit County...." The 
acquisition of that interest was confirmed by Security Title when it joined with Pine Meadow 
as "owners" in executing Plat D. 
7. In addition to the limitation and direction in Peters' deed, the recordation of the 
1973 CC&Rs imports constructive notice of their contents. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 57-3-102, 574a-2 (2000). The 1973 CC&Rs as recorded by Pine Meadow admittedly 
appeared of record. 
8. The Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D ("Plat D"), was recorded with the Summit 
County Recorder on May 6, 1976. It plainly states that it was recorded by the stated 
"owners" of the property, Jensen's company Pine Meadow and Security Title Company, 
Trustee. (R. 0204; Memorandum Decision f 4.) 
9. Plat D was executed by the declared owners, Pine Meadow (by W. Brent 
Jensen, President, and Zella J. Jensen, Secretary) and by Security Title Company, Trustee (by 
Gordon H. Dick, Executive Vice President). (R. 0204.) Each party's signature on the plat 
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explicitly confirmed the ownership interest of the other party. The signatures were duly 
acknowledged and the plat was recorded. (Id.) 
10. In fact, Plat D confirms that it was "recorded and filed at the request of Pine 
Meadow Ranch." (Id.) 
11. In the Subdivider' s Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, Pine Meadow 
was identified as the subdivider of the land as well as an owner of the land. (Id.) 
12. The Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always shared a 
common water and roadway system and, on May 30, 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch 
Landowners Association was merged into the Association by shareholder vote. (R. 0259.) 
13. Since the merger in 1978, the Association has operated as the homeowners' 
association for all of the 800 plus lots, homes and cabins in the Pine Meadow and Forest 
Meadow subdivisions. (Id.) 
14. Lot ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association, including 
the obligation to pay assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the Association's 
annual meetings. (R. 0260.) Access to lots within the Association's boundary, including Lot 
6D, can only be had through the Association's roadway network. 
15. To confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs recorded against 
various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, the Association republished those 
CC&Rsintheformofthe 1980 Lien Notice recorded on July 25,1980 as Entry No. 168800 
in Book 163 at Page 152 of the records of the Summit County Recorder, and therein gave 
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notice of an address at which confirmation of payments of any assessments could be 
obtained. (R. 0261-62.) 
16. In response to questions raised in part as a result of this lawsuit, on April 3, 
2003, the Association recorded the Clarification of Notice of Lien as Entry No. 653634 in 
Book 1523 at Page 1809, confirming that the 1980 Lien Notice was intended merely to 
republish the existing CC&Rs and other encumbrances of record and did not create any new 
charge or encumbrance on any property. (R. 262.) 
17. The Association operated with funds collected by the Pine Meadow Special 
Service District until Summit County determined to dissolve the Special Service District in 
1999. Upon dissolution of the Special Service District, Summit County conveyed to the 
Association an exclusive easement (concurrent with the rights of the local water company) 
for the control, operation, construction and maintenance of the roads in the Pine Meadow and 
Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 269.) The Association has since assessed its members 
under the authority of its articles of incorporation and by-laws, to pay for the maintenance 
and insurance of the roads and open space, and for other Association purposes. Petitioner 
has refused to pay any assessment made by the Association. (R. 259 - 261.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Pine Meadow acted in the role of the developer in imposing, through recorded 
CC&Rs, a structure for a future owners5 association, subdividing the land by recording an 
ownership plat, creating the owners' association, and obviously arranging the sales of the lots 
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it created. Its authority to do so is amply confirmed by the active collaboration of the legal 
title holder, Security Title Company, Trustee. 
Pine Meadow first declared its status as an owner in, and as authority for, the recorded 
1973 CC&Rs. It then proceeded with the preparation, approval, and recordation of the plat 
to create the Forest Meadow Plat D subdivision. Its roles as owner, subdivider and the party 
that recorded the plat are expressly stated on the face of the plat. Equally clear on the face 
of the plat is the approving participation of Security Title, Trustee, which signed with Pine 
Meadow as an owner. At the time the plat was signed and recorded, Security Title had notice 
of the 1973 CC&Rs, which were already of record. Significantly, the signatures of Security 
Title and Pine Meadow were simultaneously notarized by Pine Meadow's attorney, Lee 
Rudd, the same individual who notarized and recorded the 1973 CC&Rs. Security Title 
thereafter conveyed title to the Plat D lots created by Pine Meadow to Peters' predecessor-in-
interest subject to restrictions and reservations appearing of record. All of this 
contemporaneous evidence confirms that Pine Meadow acted with authority in imposing the 
1973 CC&Rs. 
Peters counters by arguing that the law of trusts prohibited Pine Meadow's actions and 
that the Court of Appeals effectively overturned the law of trusts by affirming the Trial 
Court. Peters is wrong. The ruling of the Court of Appeals was carefully tailored to the 
uncontested facts of this case. It made no broad pronouncements and overturned no 
precedent. Pine Meadow, the beneficial title holder, never purported to convey fee title to 
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the property and did not create a competing chain of title. It did not attempt to convey the 
Trustee's fee interest in the trust assets. To the contrary, Pine Meadow acted within the 
scope of its beneficial interest as the developer of the property and effected the planned 
conditions and subdivision of the land. Security Title confirmed or ratified Pine Meadow's 
authority to so act by joining with Pine Meadow in the execution and recording of the plat 
and then conveying the lots created thereby subject to the restrictions of record. 
The other technical issues raised by Peters, including ratification and the statute of 
frauds are not within the issue defined by the grant of the writ of certiorari. Even if they 
were properly raised herein, however, Peters has not shown that the Court of Appeals erred. 
Security Title's joinder with Pine Meadow in the platting process as an owner, and its 
subsequent conveyance of the lots created by Pine Meadow subject to the previously 
recorded restrictions confirms that Pine Meadow either acted within its existing authority 
as developer or that Security Title ratified Pine Meadow's prior actions. There is no other 
logical construct of the uncontroverted facts. 
Finally, the Association is constrained to note the unjust and scandalous criticism of 
the Court of Appeals and, in particular, of Judge Greenwood, in the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari and in Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief. These derogatory references are 
improper, unsupported and unsupportable, and far beyond the limits of decorum established 
by applicable standards. As a result, Peters' briefs should be disregarded or stricken by the 
Court, and attorneys' fees should be assessed. 
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ARGUMENT 
L PINE MEADOW HAD THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE BINDING 
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE PROPERTY 
IT WAS DEVELOPING. 
The pervasive role of Brent Jensen and his companies, including Pine Meadow, in the 
development of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions is obvious from 
recorded documents that establish and govern the subdivisions. Though the documents may 
be less than elegant by today's title standards, they describe an incontestable course of a 
phased development, with Security Title Company holding legal title, while Jensen's 
interests, holding beneficial title, acted as the developer of the various phases. Jensen, 
through successive entities that apparently reflected different investor groups, recorded 
covenants, prepared and recorded plats, constructed roads and a water system, and sold and 
conveyed lots. While the original records that described the relationship between Security 
Title and the Jensen interests are no longer available, the object and result of this 
collaborative effort are readily apparent in the 800-lot community they created. 
That Jensen acted with authority and the acquiescence of Security Title is conclusively 
confirmed by the joinder of Security Title with Pine Meadow in executing Plat D as owners 
and by Security Title's subsequent conveyance of the lots (including Lot 6D) subject to the 
restrictions and reservations that have been of record for 30 years. For these and other 
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reasons, the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached the correct result, and they did so 
on alternative bases.3 
Peters persists in its attacks on the 1973 CC&Rs by self-defining a number of 
incongruous legal pigeonholes, and then complaining that it cannot fit this fact situation 
neatly within them. Peters spots a number of hypothetical issues, but cannot reconcile them 
with the phased development of real property in which a watchful trustee took an active and 
approving role. The difficulty with Peters' position lies not with the underlying facts but 
with the impractical and hyper technical legal analysis it attempts to employ. Peters' lengthy 
parade of parentheticals and hypothetical horribles ignore both history and logic, and 
demonstrate a refusal to recognize the fundamental fact that this land was in fact developed 
by Jensen and his companies, including Pine Meadow. Simply put, had Jensen and Pine 
Meadow not had the authority to develop Pine Meadow Plat D, Lot 6D would not exist. In 
other words, Peters acquired its land, and therefore its standing herein, only by virtue of the 
acts of the very developer whose authority it now challenges. The illogic of its position 
doomed Peters' effort before the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, and Peters will not 
be able to escape it here. 
3
 The Court of Appeals, for instance, did not disturb the Trial Court's findings 
that Peters' challenge to the 1973 CC&Rs is untimely, and it would be inequitable for Peters 
to avoid compliance with the 1973 CC&Rs where it took with notice of them and enjoys the 
benefits provided by the Association. (R. 00418 - 419.) These points are not embraced in 
the issue as to which certiorari was granted and will not be further addressed herein. 
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A. Pine Meadow's Authority to Impose the 1973 CC&Rs is Confirmed 
by the Records Furnished by Peters, 
The facts material to this action are not in dispute. The parties acknowledged both 
that the recorded documents placed before the Trial Court were accurate copies and that they 
comprise all of the relevant, recorded documents. Both parties urged the Trial Court to 
resolve the case by Summary Judgment. Those records stand as ample evidence of Pine 
Meadow's authority on two separate bases: (1) they establish time-honored presumptions 
of authority that Peters has not, and cannot, rebut; and (2) they stand separately as evidence 
of that authority and of the pattern of the development process followed by Pine Meadow and 
Security Title. 
Precisely to address situations where a party may seek to challenge documents long 
after memories have faded and evidence has been lost, Utah law establishes a specific 
statutory presumption that "recitals and other statements of fact in a [recorded] 
document... are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). A recital by definition is 
"[a] preliminary statement in a contract or deed explaining the background of the transaction 
or showing the existence of particular facts." Black's Law Dictionary 1276 (7th ed. 1999). 
When recitals and other statements of fact are included in a recorded document, the 
presumption of their truth "may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence." 
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (concerning the presumption in 
13 
section 57-4a-4 (l)(j) that delivery of a deed occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time 
between the date on the document and the date of recording).4 
The 1973 CC&Rs recite that Pine Meadow was the "owner" of "the South half of 
Section 22, Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which will 
consist of all the lots of the Forest Meadow Ranch subdivisions within this area," (R. 00475-
78), a portion of which ultimately became Lot 105 A. The 1973 CC&Rs were signed by W. 
Brent Jensen, as President of Pine Meadow. Id. By statutory presumption, this statement in 
the recorded 1973 CC&Rs establishes that Pine Meadow Development had an ownership 
interest in the property at the time the 1997 1973 CC&Rs were recorded. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). Peters offered no contrary evidence. 
The 1973 CC&Rs further state that "the reservations and restrictive covenants herein 
set out are to run with the land and shall be binding upon all persons owning or occupying 
any lot...." (R. 00475-78). The neighboring Pine Meadow 1973 CC&Rs similarly provided 
that "all of the properties . . . . shall be held, sold and conveyed subject to the following 
easements, restrictions, covenants, and conditions, which are for the purpose of protecting 
the value and desirability of, which shall run with, the real property." (R. 00181-90). This 
pattern was followed by Pine Meadow and its successors in the development of the multiple 
plats that created the 800 Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow lots that are members of the 
4
 Forest Meadow's argument that the 1973 CC&Rs are invalid under the Utah 
general law of trusts because the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to encumber 
specific properties held by the trustee in trust are addressed below. 
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Association. The intent and effect of the declarations is evident both in their language and 
their effect. In fact, the lands were subdivided and sold, and have since been governed by 
the 1973 CC&Rs. That the stated goal of protecting the value and desirability of the lands 
subject thereto has been met is presumably evidenced by the fact that Peters was attracted to 
the area. 
B. Pine Meadow's Actions Were Consistent With its Beneficial 
Interest. 
Covenants affecting land may be imposed by a person or entity authorized to do so. 
That authority may be based in an ownership consistent with the interest expressed in the 
covenants. This Court, in Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776 
P.2d 618,629 (Utah 1989) confirmed that covenants which run with the land "must be based 
in some interest in land." (Emphasis added.) The precise nature of the interest upon which 
such covenants must be based was not specified. Rather, the Court held: "[T]o touch and 
concern the land, a covenant must bear upon the use and enjoyment of the land and be of the 
kind that the owner of a estate or interest in land may make because of his ownership right." 
Id., at 623 (citations omitted). Pine Meadow possessed such an ownership right. 
The nature of the relationship between Security Title, the legal title owner, and Pine 
Meadow, the beneficial title holder, is easily inferred. The recitals in the record documents, 
and the phased development of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, amply 
confirm Pine Meadow's role as developer of Forest Meadow Plat D. Its beneficial interest 
in the land was that of a developer with the right to develop the land subject to the ultimate 
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satisfaction of the financial or other requirements imposed upon the trustee by the trustor. 
This was the obvious nature and purpose of Pine Meadow's beneficial interest in the land. 
We need not speculate or indulge in hypotheticals about what Pine Meadow might have done 
with the land because we know the course of its development activities. Pine Meadow's 
course of development is evident in the records of the Summit County Recorder and in the 
large, contiguous community of subdivisions it left behind. No less evident is the fact that 
Security Title, as Trustee, acknowledged and confirmed the authority of the beneficial title 
holder by joining in the platting of the land with knowledge of the 1973 CC&Rs previously 
recorded by Pine Meadow, and by Security Title's subsequent conveyance of the platted lots 
subject to the 1973 CC&Rs. 
This history is made plain by the detail of the uncontroverted evidence furnished to 
the Trial Court. As noted above, Lot 6D was created by the plat that established Plat D of 
the Pine Meadow Ranch subdivision. (R. 00135). Pine Meadow Ranch Plat D, which was 
recorded with the Summit County Recorder on May 6,1976, clearly recites that the "owners" 
of the property were Pine Meadow and Security Title. The Owners' Declaration indicates, 
in relevant part: 
Know all men by these presents that , the undersigned 
owners of the above described tract of land, having caused the 
same to be subdivided into lots & streets hereafter to be known 
as: PINE MEADOW RANCH, PLAT "D" do hereby dedicate 
for perpetual use of the public all parcels of land shown on this 
plat as intended for public use. 
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(R. 00135). The plat was then signed by Pine Meadow (by W. Brent Jensen, President, and 
Zella J. Jensen, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as Trustee (by Gordon H. Dick), 
as owners. (R. 00204). 
The Subdivider's Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, provides additional 
evidence that Pine Meadow was the beneficial owner of the property being subdivided. The 
note, signed by Bret Jensen, reads: 
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of 
roads and streets or rights of way to public. It is intended that 
all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of the 
subdivider, Pine Meadow Ranch, shall be completely 
maintained by said owner. 
(R. 00204). The Surveyor's Certificate provides additional evidence and proof that Pine 
Meadow was an owner at the time Plat D was recorded. This certification provides, in 
relevant part, "I, Ralph L. Northrup, do hereby certify . . . that I have, by authority of the 
Owners . . . subdivided said tract of land shown on this plat & described below into lots & 
streets, hereafter to be known as PINE MEADOW RANCH, PLAT <D.'" (R. 00204). 
Security Title, as Trustee, by its signature clearly agreed with and ratified the recital of Pine 
Meadow's ownership interest. 
This evidence is consistent with the import of the presumption, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-4a-4(i)(j), to the effect that Security Title held legal title as a "Trustee" on behalf of its 
principal, and that the beneficial title holder, was Pine Meadow, the party that signed and 
recorded the 1971 1973 CC&Rs. (R. 00135). Utah Law is clear to the effect that: 
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There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal 
title possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial 
interest. . . . Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial 
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is 
held purely for the benefit of another. 
Capital Assets Finan. Serv. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9, f 17, 994 P.2d 201.5 
No evidence suggests other than that Pine Meadow was the beneficial owner of the 
property that ultimately became Lot 105A at the time the 1973 CC&Rs were recorded. 
Peters acknowledges that "the uniform practice is not to record the trust instrument" 
(Opening Brief, p. 24) and then complains that it is not able to locate a copy three or four 
decades later. Peters here acknowledges that it cannot meet its burden of overcoming the 
presumption that the statements in the 1973 CC&Rs are true. Peters also tacitly 
acknowledges something more significant: that no one challenged the authority of Pine 
Meadow to record the 1973 CC&Rs at the time the property was being developed. Peters has 
5
 Peters complains about the Court of Appeals' analysis of Capital Assets. At 
page 21 of its Opening Brief, Peters claims, "No reasonable person could have drawn the 
Court of Appeal's [sic] holding from the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range 
of'innocent mistake' or even 'negligent mistake.'" In other words, Peters accuses the Court 
of Appeals of making a deliberate misstatement, of intentionally violating the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. The accusation is unfounded and scandalous. 
While the Court may have been more explicit in the parenthetical explanation 
of the import of Capital Assets in the citation at f 36 of its opinion, Capital Assets does 
support the general conclusion for which it was cited. In discussing the purposes of the 
judgment lien statute in Capital Assets, this Court stated, "a judgment lien attaches to a 
debtor's beneficial and equitable property interests, even if the debtor has no record title." 
Capital Assets, 2000 UT 9 at ^ [15 (citations omitted.) Here, and under the authorities cited 
in the next argument, a beneficial title holder may indeed encumber its interest in the 
property. 
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offered no evidence to suggest that the trustor or the trustee challenged or in any way 
disagreed with the recording of the 1973 CC&Rs by Pine Meadow, or with Pine Meadow's 
authority to do so. To the contrary, Security Title joined in the platting of the property and 
subsequently conveyed title to the lots created by Pine Meadow. The trustor, presumably, 
accepted payment for the land and vanished from the record. 
The Court of Appeals found that all traditional requirements of privity necessary for 
the enforcement of the 1973 CC&Rs exist in this case. Opinion, f^ 35.6 Such analysis is 
instructive, because established privity is consistent with Pine Meadow's authority to act in 
a development role and to record the 1973 CC&Rs. Beyond that, however, "substance 
should prevail over technical form so that a homeowner's association which had no interest 
in the property at all could sue to enforce a covenant." Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. 
Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d 618, 628 n. 13 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
6
 The trial court held consistently and stated in the alternative, "even if there was 
no vertical privity, as a matter of equity, the court agrees with [the Association] that prior 
predecessors in interest have treated the covenants as covenants that run with the land and 
so must [Peters]. A challenge to these covenants over thirty years later is untimely and must 
be barred." (R. 00380). Clearly, in Utah, a party must prevail in claims on the strength of 
his own title and not on the weakness of another. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, 
Inc., 87 P.3d 734,790 (Utah App. 2004). Again, there are not competing chains of title here. 
All agree that Peters owns Lot 105 A. The only question is whether Peters is bound by the 
1973 CC&Rs recorded against it. 
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II. TO THE EXTENT THE TRUST AND OTHER ISSUES BRIEFED 
BY PETERS ARE FAIRLY ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THE 
SINGLE ISSUE AS TO WHICH THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
WAS GRANTED, THEY DO NOT REQUIRE A DIFFERENT 
RESULT THAN THAT REACHED BY THE LOWER COURTS. 
Peters' primary "pigeonhole," its response to the issue as posited in the writ of 
certiorari, is to challenge the existence of the trust, assume that it had "spendthrift" 
limitations, and then dispute the authority of those who acted for it. (Opening Brief, 
argument 4.) However, the issue the parties were directed to brief assume the existence of 
the trust described by the Court of Appeals, and that Pine Meadow held a beneficial interest 
thereunder. Peters' arguments disputing the existence of a trust are thus not properly before 
the Court. "Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals' decision and 
is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petitions." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. 
Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998). "Only questions set forth in the petition or fairly 
included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court." Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). "This 
Court's grant of a petition of certiorari does not allow a second plenary appeal." Debry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). "Issues not presented in the petition for certiorari, 
or if presented, not included in the order granting certiorari and fairly encompassed within 
such issues, are not properly before the court on the merits." Id. (emphasis added). 
As the issue framed by the Court presupposes the existence of the trust, the focus of 
argument must be on whether the rights and powers of a trust beneficiary may include the 
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authority to impose binding 1973 CC&Rs on trust property. Peters is precluded from calling 
into question the existence of a trust. 
Assuming that Peters' arguments are properly before the Court, the Association notes 
that Pine Meadow never purported to convey fee title to the land subject to the trust. It did 
not create a competing chain of title and the Association acknowledges Peters' title to Lot 
105 A. Title to the trust res, in other words, remained with Security Title as Trustee until the 
land had been platted and Security Title was in a position to convey the individual lots 
developed by Pine Meadow and Security. 
Peters argues that, as beneficial owner, Pine Meadow had no power of disposition. 
(Opening Brief, p. 17.) Peters makes that statement with no knowledge of the terms of the 
trust and in disregard of Pine Meadow's obvious role as developer of the property. As noted 
above, trustees hold title for the benefit of others. They have no beneficial interest. The 
beneficial ownership of the property in question here, both in fact and under the issue stated 
by the Court, was held by Pine Meadow. Peters argues that, as beneficial owner, Pine 
Meadow had no power to act with regard to the property. Peters is wrong. 
As a general rule, "the beneficiary of a trust has the power to transfer his interest." 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 132 (1959). This rule "is applicable to transfers of a part 
of the beneficiary's interest as well as to transfers of the whole of his interest." Id. § 132 
cmt. c; see generally George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 188 (Rev. 
2d ed., 2005) ("In the absence of provisions in the trust instrument or a statute to the 
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contrary, the beneficiary may alienate his interest as freely as he might a legal estate or 
interest." (footnotes omitted)), and the cases cited therein. Furthermore, "the interest of the 
beneficiary may also be devised, mortgaged, or encumbered." Bogert, The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees at § 188 (footnotes omitted). 
This principle was recognized in the early Utah case, Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. 
College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949): 
"According to the great weight of authority, . . . where the 
instrument creating the trust contains no express words of 
restraint and nothing in (sic) on its face declaring that the 
purpose thereof is to provide a support for the beneficiary and 
to furnish him with the comforts of life, and where it requires 
that the revenue arising from such trust shall be paid directly to 
the beneficiary without any direction concerning its application 
and without any discretion being vested in the trustee as to the 
time or amount of such payments or the purpose to which they 
shall be applied, such revenue may be anticipated, or assigned 
by the beneficiary or by proper proceedings subjected to the 
payment of his debts." 
Id. at 284 (alterations in original) (quotingNunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co,, 245 S.W.421,422 
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1922)). 
The general right of the beneficiary to alienate its interest in the trust res is 
reaffirmed by the Utah Uniform Trust Code (the Trust Code).7 See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 75-7-101 to -1201 (Supp. 2005). For example, the Trust Code defines "[bjeneficiary" as 
7
 The Trust Code is relevant to the trust in the present case. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-1103(l)(a) ("Except as otherwise provided, this chapter applies to: (a) all trusts 
created before, on, or after July 1, 2004 . . . ."). 
22 
a person that "has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent"; or 
"in a capacity other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust property." 
Id. § 75-7-103(b). "[P]ower of appointment" is not defined by the Trust Code. However, 
the phrase has a long history at common law where it has been stated that "the essence of 
such a power is that it gives to the donee the power to cause some person to receive less of 
the subject property and another person to receive more." In re Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d 
617, 619 (Utah 1987); see generally 62 Am. Jur. 2d Powers of Appointment, Etc. § 2 (2005) 
("The power of appointment has been defined simply as the power to dispose of 
property . . . ."). While a power of appointment may not be directly involved here, by 
defining a "beneficiary" as one who "holds a power of appointment," the legislature 
implicitly acknowledged a trust beneficiary's general power to dispose of its beneficial 
interest in the trust res. 
In exception to the general rule, the trust instrument may limit the beneficiary's power 
of transfer, generally through a "spendthrift provision,"8 but the intent to restrain the 
beneficiary's power of transfer must be clearly shown.9 See Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 283. In 
8
 For an example of a spendthrift provision, see In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 
1238, 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Both wills contained the following spendthrift clause: 
No beneficiary of my estate shall have any right to alienate, encumber, or hypothecate his or 
her interest in said estate or the income therefrom, nor shall such interest of any beneficiary 
be subject to claims of his or her creditors or liable to attachment, execution, or other process 
of law."). 
9
 Similar restraints include a "discretionary trust," which places distribution at 
the discretion of the trustee, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-504 (Supp. 2005), or a trust for 
support or maintenance. 
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the present case, there is no indication that the trust was subject to a spendthrift provision or 
other restraint on the beneficiary.l0 Accordingly, because such a restraint must clearly be 
shown, see Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 283, Pine Meadow had a general power of disposition of 
its beneficial interest. 
Cronquist is also instructive as to the extent Utah law permits a beneficiary to alienate 
its beneficial interest. In Cronquist, the Irustor died testate in 1927, leaving a substantial 
estate in real and personal property, some of which, including College Farm, "was by the 
terms of the will left to the Cache Valley Bank Company as trustee, to hold in trust for twenty 
years." Id. at 281. The beneficiaries of the trust were the trustor's three children, one of 
whom was the plaintiff to the instant action. Id. On November 9, 1944, "before the 
termination of the trust estate," Id. at 282, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with Utah 
State Agricultural College (the college), whereby the plaintiff agreed to sell to the college 
his "undivided one-third interest in the College farm, for $10,000, and at the same time [the] 
plaintiff[] executed a quitclaim deed to the land." Id. at 282. The deed was deposited with 
the trustee, for delivery to the college "upon approval of the agreement by [the college's] 
Board of Trustees." Id. The quitclaim deed was later delivered to the college, and recorded 
10
 Indeed, such restraints may not have been valid at the time this trust was 
executed and wholly operated. Although generally discussing spendthrift trusts, the 
Cronquist Court refused to recognize their validity. See Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. 
College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280 (1949) ("This opinion is not to be construed as a 
holding by implication that spendthrift trusts are valid in Utah to any extent. As to that 
question we express no opinion.") 
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on November 20, 1944. The trustee continued to hold the land in trust until the trust was 
terminated in 1947 (at the end of the twenty-year trust period) "and the trust assets [were] 
conveyed to the beneficiaries." Id. 
The plaintiff commenced suit "to have [his] contract with, and deed to [the college] 
declared null and void." Id. The college counterclaimed "for specific performance of the 
contract and that title to an undivided one-third of the lands in question be quieted to it." Id. 
The district court ruled against the plaintiff and in favor of the college. See id. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trust was a spendthrift trust, and that 
therefore the plaintiff could not "anticipate his interest therein, nor could he alienate it in the 
fashion attempted to be done here." The college, for its part, insisted that the trust was not 
a spendthrift trust, "and that the contract and deed executed by [the] plaintiff[] are in all 
respects binding." Id. The Supreme Court affirmed affirmed the judgment of the district 
court quieting title to the property in the college. Id. at 285. 
This reasoning is applicable here, which involves a trust similarly free from restraint. 
The Court of Appeals confirmed that the 1973 CC&Rs are covenants that run with the land. 
See Forest Meadow Ranch Prop. Owners Ass 'n, L.L. C. v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass 'n, 
2005 UT App 294, f 39,118 P.3d 871. It does not follow, however, that imposition of 1973 
CC&Rs, which are in the nature of a contract between future owners of the land, is an 
alienation of the fee title to the land. 
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1973 CC&Rs act as a contract established by a prior owner that affects property and 
is construed under principles of contract law: 
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber 
subdivision lots form a contract between subdivision property 
owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore, 
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of 
construction as those used to interpret contracts. 
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000) (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants 
§ 170 (1995)) (additional citations omitted) See also Holladay Duplex Management 
Company, L.L.C, v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104, 105-106 (Utah App. 2002) (noting deeds and 
restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts); Canyon Meadows 
Home Owners Association v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d 1148,1151 (Utah App. 2001) (same). 
As noted above, the CC&Rs must "be of the kind that the owner of an estate or interest in 
land may make because of his ownership right." Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 623. Since 
the nature and purpose of Pine Meadow's beneficial interest was that of a developer, the 
imposition of 1973 CC&Rs and the platting of the land was entirely consistent with its 
interest in the trust. Even if the imposition of 1973 CC&Rs could be deemed an alienation 
of an interest in the trust property, it was a far more modest alienation than that involved in 
Cronquist, where the beneficial owner was permitted to quitclaim his one-third interest in 
College Farm prior to the termination of the trust. 
There is further authority for the right of a beneficial owner to alienate or otherwise 
affect its interest in trust property. Absent a spendthrift provision, creditors and assignees 
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of the beneficiary enjoy a general right to attach or encumber the beneficiary's interest in the 
trust res. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-501 (Supp. 2005). In fact, the law considers the 
authority of a creditor of the beneficiary to involuntarily encumber the beneficiary's interest 
equal to the beneficiary's own authority to voluntarily encumber or alienate that interest. See 
id. § 75-7-502 (making a spendthrift provision preventing transfer valid only "if it restrains 
both voluntary and involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's interest."). Given this equality of 
rights, it would seem to make little sense to hold that a beneficiary's creditor may encumber 
the beneficiary's interest in the trust, whereas the beneficiary could not. 
Peters recognizes that "trust beneficiaries of non-spendthrift trusts have authority to 
dispose of their interests in the trusts," but contends that this is "not the power to dispose of 
trust property." (Opening Brief, p. 19.) In support of this claim, Peters cites (without 
explanation or quote) George T. Bogert, Trusts 132-42(6th ed. 1987). However, this 
statement is not clearly supported by Bogert. In fact, in his treatise, Bogert states: "The rules 
of construction with regard to equitable estates are generally the same as those regarding 
corresponding legal interests, and the beneficiary of a trust will normally take an equitable 
estate having rights and incidents similar to one owning a corresponding legal estate." 
George G. Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 182 (Rev. 2d ed., 2005). This 
reasoning comports with the action taken by the Utah Supreme Court in Cronquist, wherein 
the court permitted the beneficiary to convey, by quitclaim deed, his interest in College Farm. 
See Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 282, 285. 
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Peters also argues that the beneficiary has no power of disposition because the "long 
established rule" in both Utah and the United States at large, is that "the trustee has exclusive 
control over trust property subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust 
instrument." (Opening Brief, pp. 17-18.) In support, Peters cites In re Estate of Flake, 2003 
UT 17,f 12, 71 P.3d 589; Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1997); and 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P.2d 869 (Utah 
1981). However, Peters quotes only a part of the rule in his brief. The actual rule from these 
cases states that the trustee has: 
exclusive control of the trust property, subject only to the 
limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument, and "once a 
settlor has created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust 
property and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly 
reserved to him in the trust instrument." 
Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17 atf 12 (quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co., 632 P.2d 
at 872). When the entire rule as stated in these cases is considered, it becomes clear that the 
exclusivity of control bestowed upon the trustee is vis-a-vis the settlor, and not the 
beneficiary. Indeed, none of the cases cited by Peters involve disputes over a beneficiary's 
disposition of property. Rather, Continental Bank involved the settlor's disposition of trust 
property, see Continental Bank & Trust Co , 632 P.2d at 872; Flake concemedthe revocation 
and modification of a trust, see Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17 at ffi[ 9, 13-22; and West 
involved a challenge by children, as contingent beneficiaries of a revocable intervivos trust, 
to their father's power "either as sole trustee or surviving settlor . . . to convey the property 
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out of the trust to himself and his wife Marilyn West after his first wife Hazel West [the 
children's mother] died." Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d at 352, 353. The present case, 
by contrast, involves the active beneficiary of a trust. In such cases, as noted, the general 
rule is that such a beneficiary can dispose of and encumber his beneficial interest in the trust 
res. See Cronquist, 201 P.2d at 282, 285. 
ffl. PETERS' CRITICISM OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS 
SCANDALOUS AND UNJUST, AS A RESULT OF THESE ATTACKS 
ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT, PETERS' BRIEF MAY 
APPROPRIATELY BE STRICKEN AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
SHOULD BE ASSESSED. 
In the six years since Peters filed this action, it has availed itself of the benefits of 
Association membership, while variously blaming the Association, its counsel and the Courts 
for the continuing existence of the Association and community attributes it represents. The 
pursuit of its claims to an expense and extent entirely disproportionate to their import may 
be Peters' right, but even that right must be exercised within established bounds of civility 
and decorum. "Derogatory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has 
no place in an appellate brief and is of no assistance to this Court in attempting to resolve any 
legitimate issues presented on appeal." State v. Cook, 1\A P.2d 296 (Utah 1986); see also 
Advanced Restoration LLC v. Priskos, 2005 UT App 505 n. 13. This caution was issued in 
a case involving a pro se defendant; it applies with much greater force to a defendant 
represented by an experienced attorney and instructor of attorneys. Rule 24(j) of the Utah 
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Rules of Appellate Procedure requires briefs filed in this Court to be free from scandalous 
matters and provides that briefs containing such materials may be disregarded or stricken. 
Throughout this litigation, Peters has refused to acknowledge the possibility that it 
might be mistaken, and that the development process that created Lot 105 A also resulted in 
the creation of a community association of which Peters is a member. Peters has instead 
persistently blamed others for the fact it has not prevailed. At various stages of this action, 
it has accused opposing counsel of bad faith and challenged the standing of the Association 
to defend itself against Peters' claims. Thus far, the Association has chosen to ignore these 
insinuations and has attempted to focus instead on the relevant facts and law. 
The Association still believes that the proper focus herein should be on the merits of 
the dispute. However, the derogatory and baseless charges of intentional judicial misconduct 
made in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and in the Peters/Appellant's Opening Brief are 
so scandalous and inappropriate that, consistent with the admonition in the comment to Rule 
8.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized, 
the Association feels constrained to object and bring them to the attention of this Court.11 
Peters' repeated criticism of the Utah Court of Appeals and, in particular, Judge 
Greenwood, is offensive and inappropriate. In particular, the Association directs the Court's 
11
 The charges appear to arise from a factual misstatement by the Court of 
Appeals when it stated that the Forest Meadow Plat D plat had been signed on behalf of 
Security Title by W. Brent Jensen rather than by Leo D. Jensen. (Opinion, n. 2 and f 30). 
That error was the stated basis for a Petition for Rehearing which was denied record cite not 
because of bias or corruption, as argued by Peters, but because the misstated fact was 
obviously immaterial to the Court's decision. 
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attention to the hostile and demeaning tenor of the pointed accusation that Judge Greenwood 
intentionally fabricated evidence to establish factual support for a pre-conceived result. This 
and other wholly unsupported charges of bias, prejudice, and intentional misconduct (i.e., 
"This was no innocent mistake") are made at pages 5-8 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
The charges are again sarcastically invoked at pp. 16 - 17 of the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Peters did not exhaust his emotion with the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. At pages 
21-22 of Petitioner/Appellant's Opening Brief, Peters renewed its attack. Referencing the 
import of Capital Assets discussed in footnote 7, above, Peters sarcastically accused the 
Court of Appeals of intentionally misstating the holding of that case.12 
These public attacks on the integrity of the Court of Appeals and, in particular, Judge 
Greenwood, are baseless and inappropriate. They are made in violation of Rule 8.2 (a) of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits false or reckless public statements 
concerning the integrity of a judge, and they certainly violate Standards 1 and 3 of the 
Standards of Professionalism and Civility. These requirements are consistent with a lawyer's 
obligations under Rule 3.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and its interpreting 
12
 "No reasonable person could have drawn the Court of Appeals' holding from 
the actual holding of this Court. It is beyond the range of 'innocent mistake' or even 
'negligent mistake.' The truth is sometimes a matter of degree - as when the defendant 
claimed he didn't know the revolver was loaded when he accidentally shot his wife - six 
times." Opening Brief at 21. 
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comment. Hostile and derogatory references are simply not appropriate. See Cook; 
Advanced Restoration, L.L.C. v. Priskos, 126 P.3d 786 , 2005 UT App 505, fn 13. 
Peters' Briefs violate that rule to such a clear extent that they should not be considered 
by the Court and attorneys' fees should be assessed. 
CONCLUSION 
Pine Meadow had the authority to impose binding covenants, conditions and 
restrictions on the lands of its phased development. Its authority to so act within its 
beneficial interest as developer of the property is confirmed by the recitals in the recorded 
documents, by the confirming and ratifying conduct of Security Title, Trustee, by the lack 
of objection by the trustor and any of the other owners of lots in the community it developed 
over a 30-year period, and by the authorities generally permitting a beneficiary to alienate or 
encumber its beneficial interest in a trust. Peters acquired title to a lot created by Pine 
Meadow and cannot now complain that Pine Meadow lacked authority to develop the lot. 
The Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals should therefore be affirmed. 
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In addition, Peters' briefs should be disregarded or stricken by the Court because they 
contain derogatory and scandalous accusations of judicial misconduct not supported in this 
record. Attorneys' fees should therefore be assessed against Peters. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of February 2006. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
EDWIN C. BARNES 
WALTER A. ROMNEY, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondent /Appellee 
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 57. Real Estate 
*li Chapter 3. Recording of Documents 
*a Part 1. General Provisions 
-f§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice—Change in interest rate—Validity of 
document—Notice of unnamed interests—Conveyance by grantee 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed 
by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying 
with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of 
location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying 
with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not acknowledged shall, from the time of 
recording with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of 
their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured 
obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document 
provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the 
parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names 
the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person 
with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person 
not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free 
and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as 
grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets 
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and 
describes the real property subject to the interest. 
Laws 1977, c. 272, § 54; Laws 1985, c. 159, § 7; Laws 1988, c. 155, § 14; Laws 
1989, c. 88, § 8; Laws 1998, c. 61, § 2, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 85, § 
4, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 252, § 11, eff. July 1, 2001. 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2000; C.L. 1907, § 2000; C.L. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 
1933, § 78-3-2; C. 1943, § 78-3-2; C. 1953, § 57-3-2. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
Title 57. Real Estate 
CHAPTER 4A. EFFECTS OF RECORDING 
Chapter 4A. Effects of Recording 
-+§ 57-4a-4. Presumptions 
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the 
real property affected: 
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting 
to execute it; 
(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf it is 
executed are the persons they purport to be; 
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a minor at any 
relevant time; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates on the 
document and the date of recording; 
(e) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described 
by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times; 
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer of an 
organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity: 
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of his 
authority; 
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all 
applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and 
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted for a 
principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time; 
(h) a person executing the document as an individual: 
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4 
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on 
the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and 
the grantor received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth 
so that the joinder of the nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 
75-2-201 through 75-2-207; 
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final 
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed 
pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor 
acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the execution of the 
document were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without 
limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true. 
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document 
purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest of the 
person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed. 
Laws 1988, c. 155, § 22; Laws 1989, c. 88, § 11. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4, UT ST § 57-4a-4 
Current through end of 2005 First Special Session 
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